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 Executive Turnover Revisited From an Efficiency Wage 
Perspective 
Abstract 
We develop theoretical arguments from the efficiency wage model (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984) in 
order to better understand Fama’s (1980) seminal notion that executive labor markets contribute 
to the alignment of executive and shareholder interests.  We show how the efficiency wage 
model can be integrated with several other theories of executive turnover.  Further, the model 
allows for predictions that have received very little analysis to date, such as the effect of firm risk 
and executive salaries on turnover.  We test predictions from the model on a sample of 
executives from 280 manufacturing firms observed annually from 1986 to 1992.  Our sample 
includes data on over 12,000 observations and nearly 1,700 employment terminations. The 
results are consistent with the main predictions of the efficiency wage model.  Holding 
performance constant, boards of directors are less patient with (more likely to dismiss) 
executives who have lower salaries and those in higher risk firms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The separation of ownership and control raises significant concerns about executive 
compensation and governance. The recent scandals at companies like Enron, WorldCom, and 
AOL/Time Warner, among others, have moved this concern to the front pages of newspapers. 
Behind each of these cases there seems to be a common story – the senior executives at the 
companies have made themselves wealthy by carrying out actions that are contrary to the 
interests of shareholders, causing large financial losses. 
A number of academic studies have analyzed the corporate governance mechanisms 
necessary to prevent cases like those mentioned above. The two most prominent mechanisms 
considered are executive compensation and executive turnover. The scholarly work has focused 
on the factors that are associated with different forms of executive compensation (for a review, 
see Gomez- Mejia & Wiseman, 1997 or Murphy, 1999) or executive job change, i.e., dismissal 
or succession (for a review, see Kesner & Sebora, 1994 or Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996, 
Chapter 6).1 Our study links, both theoretically and empirically, these two streams of literature – 
compensation and turnover. 
In studies of corporate governance, agency theory is by far the most prominent theoretical 
framework, and Fama (1980) and Jensen & Meckling (1976) are the primary references. Fama 
argues that the alignment of shareholder and executive interests could be perfect if shareholders 
could (at zero cost) detect actions taken by executives that are not in shareholder interests. In this 
situation, shareholders would simply use the information to adjust the executive’s future earnings 
stream. However, because it is expensive and difficult to monitor executives, firm performance is 
used to estimate executive behavior. The past performance stream associated with the executive 
is used to set future compensation policy as well as the threat of dismissal. For executives, the 
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threat of ex poste settling up is a key motivator, and helps to keep their interests aligned with 
those of shareholders. The two central predictions from Fama (1980) are (1) poor firm 
performance will lead to executive dismissal; and (2) executive salaries will be contingent on 
firm-level performance. However, the empirical evidence regarding these two predictions varies 
considerably. On the first prediction, there is widespread empirical evidence linking a variety of 
firm performance measures to executive turnover, and widespread agreement that poor firm 
performance increases the likelihood of executive turnover (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Kesner 
& Sebora, 1994; Murphy, 1999). On the other hand, the prediction that executive compensation 
should be performance-contingent has received much less empirical support (Baker, Jensen & 
Murphy, 1988).  
One key problem with Fama’s (1980) arguments lies in the issue of linking executive 
actions to firm-level performance outcomes. Economic models dealing with moral hazard 
problems (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982; Harris & Raviv, 1979) offer a clarification of the dilemma. 
These authors acknowledge that firm performance is a noisy indicator of the extent to which 
executive actions align with shareholder interests. For example, the bedrock assumption upon 
which the separation of ownership and control (and therefore, the separation of decision making 
and risk bearing) is built is the assumption that business involves risk, and therefore outcomes 
anticipated ex ante may not be realized ex poste. Therefore, according to these authors, when 
firm-level performance has fallen short of anticipated outcomes, the extent of executive 
responsibility must be assessed. Thus, this approach differs importantly from both Fama (1980) 
and Jensen & Meckling (1976). The assertion that executive culpability must be assessed and 
cannot simply be inferred is a key divergence from Fama. Additionally, in recognizing that 
mistakes in executive performance evaluation are inevitable, the moral hazard approach 
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acknowledges that executives must bear some firm-level risk, even when ownership and decision 
making are separate. This conclusion contrasts with Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
When the assessment of executive performance is costly, moral hazard theory suggests 
that other contractual mechanisms, like pay for performance or dismissal policy, can align 
executive and shareholder interests at low cost (Holmstrom, 1982; Harris & Raviv, 1979). The 
efficiency wage literature of Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) provides an analytical framework. Closely 
associated with agency theory, the efficiency wage model begins with the assumption that when 
principals evaluate agent behavior, they must use uncertain measures of that behavior. Therefore, 
in order to economize on monitoring expenditures when monitoring is costly, principals can 
simply establish a threshold of performance acceptability. If performance falls below the 
threshold, the agent (in this case, the executive) will be dismissed. The executive, of course, 
understands this policy and behaves accordingly. The extent to which the executive strives to 
avoid dismissal will hinge on the expected losses associated with job termination. Salary levels 
are very important, because they are the principal determinant of those expected losses. For this 
reason, the performance threshold and the level of salary must be coordinated in order to provide 
an effective and efficient motivation of the agent.  
Our study adopts the efficiency wage approach because it permits us to move beyond the 
traditional agency theory approaches of Fama (1980) and Jensen & Meckling (1976). Combining 
the efficiency wage model with other theories, such as power theories (Shen & Cannella, 2002) 
or institution theory (Ocasio, 1999), provides an integrated and coherent explanation for many 
associations which have already received empirical support. Further, this integration also leads to 
new hypotheses which have not yet received empirical scrutiny. Our key contributions are to 
clarify the relationship between firm-level risk and executive pay level, and to show how both 
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firm-level risk and executive pay level combine to influence the probability of executive 
dismissal. 
In the section that follows, we provide a discussion of the causes behind executive 
dismissal and use efficiency wage theory to develop hypotheses. In the second section we 
describe the database and analytical methodology used to test the hypotheses. In the third 
section, we present the results of our analyses, and the final section provides the discussion and 
conclusions.  
A EFFICIENCY WAGE EXPLANATION OF EXECUTIVE DISMISSAL 
Agency theory is a theory about executive motivation. The issue we raise is why the threat of 
dismissal motivates executives in a context of imperfect supervision, where poor firm-level 
outcomes are not necessarily caused by opportunistic behavior. Efficiency wage theory attempts 
to provide an answer to this question in the context of the contractual relationships between 
workers and the company (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984; Milgrom & Roberts 1992, Chapter 9). 
Although the original work of Shapiro and Stiglitz has focused in the explanation of 
unemployment in a labor market in equilibrium, in Appendix A the formal efficiency wage 
model is extended to explain the relationships between firm-level performance and executive 
turnover. The main features derived in that appendix are described below. 
Basic assumptions 
The efficiency wage model, like most analytical work linked to agency theory, is inspired by 
transaction costs theory and, more specifically, by the value maximization theorem (Coase, 
1960; Milgrom & Roberts 1992: p. 35). The value maximization theorem suggests that any 
contractual agreement made between boards of directors and executives must be acceptable to 
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both sides. In addition, it assumes that both directors and executives desire an agreement that 
will generate the greatest possible wealth. Both parties agree that the incentive mechanism 
selected must avoid actions that result in costs for shareholders that are greater than the profits 
generated by executives.  
However, the efficiency wage model does not draw conclusions about who will initiate 
and implement the incentive mechanism. Executives may make a formal commitment to resign if 
firm performance falls below a certain level as a means of convincing the board of their good 
intentions. So, when an executive’s employment is terminated, it is very difficult to determine 
whether this action is voluntary (the executive has left in order to maintain a good reputation for 
future contracts) or involuntary (the board has acted to guarantee the good behavior of future 
executives). 
While recognizing that job termination can be voluntary or involuntary, we will 
henceforth adopt the perspective that the board initiates and implements the executive 
employment contract. One can argue that when the board observes executive actions that are 
against shareholder interests, directors will dismiss the executives and demand reimbursement 
for losses caused. However, there appears to be a wide range of actions that cannot be perfectly 
observed by shareholders or the board. Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) assume that there is only one 
possible action against shareholders interests, and when that action is taken, it can be detected 
with a certain level of probability, p. Under these assumptions, the only way to reduce the 
dismissal probability is by not taking the action, thus reducing dismissal probability by p.  
The capacity that executives have to reduce the probability of dismissal through their 
own actions is not as clear when the model is extended to the situation where there are no 
restrictions on the number of managerial actions, and boards can establish the dismissal 
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probabilities allocated to the different actions (p is an endogenous variable). Agency theory 
assumes that managerial actions will affect firm performance, including share prices. So, while 
understanding that firm-level performance is an imperfect indicator of executive actions, the 
board of directors can establish a threshold of performance acceptability. By explicitly 
establishing a specific level, or through the implicit indication of a level through previous 
dismissals of executives, boards create expectations among current executives about the 
acceptability of poor performance and the probability of dismissal associated with managerial 
actions or decisions (see top left cell in Figure 1). 
_______________________ 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
_______________________ 
 
Managers can reduce dismissal probabilities by increasing their firms’ performance. The 
higher that firm performance is above the threshold, the lower the probability of executive 
dismissal. But, a given change in firm performance will have different impacts on dismissal 
probabilities depending on the initial level of the dismissal probability and the risk of the 
performance measures. 
Assuming that firm performance follows a normal distribution,2 the reduction in 
dismissal probability caused by a given increment in expected firm performance (capacity for 
influence by executives on the probability of being dismissed) decreases as performance 
increases above the threshold level (highlighted line in the top left cell of Figure 1). On the other 
hand, in a company without risk, the executives know the exact consequences of their actions on 
firm performance and, therefore, whether they are going to be dismissed or not. In a company 
with infinite risk, it does not matter what executives do, firm performance is a result of random 
factors, so their actions will have no effect on dismissal probabilities.  
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The consequence is that managers that secure a given increase in firm performance 
experience lower reductions in dismissal probability as they move away from (are above) the 
performance threshold, or (alternatively) as dismissal probability becomes lower, and at 
companies with greater levels of risk (see the bottom left cell of Figure 1 and Appendix A for 
more details). 
Executive motivation and implications for optimal dismissal policies 
The efficiency wage mechanism motivates executives to exert more effort because they can 
reduce dismissal probability and dismissal implies adverse economic or social consequences. 
Following this logic, there are two basic motivational elements – the the punishment involved in 
dismissal (or reward for staying at the company3) and the executives’ capacity to reduce the 
probability of dismissal through their own actions which, according to the above explanations, 
increases with the dismissal probability of the executive and decreases with the risk associated 
with firm performance. 
The board must establish a level of motivation that causes executives to carry out actions 
that generate costs to shareholders lower than the profits generated. Boards will be conscious of 
the relations above, and synthesized in Figure 2. With the same level of executive rents 
(compensation) and dismissal probability, managers will be less motivated in those firms with 
greater levels of performance risk, and boards can increase the executive motivation by 
increasing executive rents or dismissal probabilities, or both. 
_______________________ 
Insert Figure 2 About Here 
_______________________ 
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If boards have to establish the same motivation level, they will do so by taking into 
account the risk of firm performance and altering the executive’s rents and performance 
thresholds, or what is the same, the optimal dismissal probabilities. So, given the relationships 
above, boards will establish higher dismissal probabilities when managers enjoy lower rents, and 
in firms with similar levels of risk, or in firms with greater levels of risk when managers obtain 
similar levels of rents. 
In summary, the implications deduced from the efficiency wage model developed in the 
appendix are: 
1) Boards of directors will fix minimum firm performance thresholds, and dismiss 
executives who fail to exceed them. The threshold will depend on the level of motivation that 
boards desire. For the set of boards that desire a given level of motivation, we should observe 
different performance thresholds depending upon the level of compensation (the cost of 
dismissal to the executive) and the risk associated with the firm’s strategy (the executive’s 
capacity to influence firm performance) (see Figure 2). 
2) Dismissal probability will increase with firm-level risk (the variance in performance). 
This is because a greater probability of dismissal is necessary under greater risk in order to 
achieve the same capability for influence by the executives, and therefore the same motivation if 
executive rents are held constant.  
3) Dismissal likelihood should decrease with higher executive rents. Higher rents indicate 
that the same level of motivation can be obtained with lower capacity of influence by executives 
on the probability of dismissal. As a consequence of this, it is necessary to reduce the probability 
of dismissal at companies with a given level of risk.  
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4) Ultimately, dismissal is a mechanism for motivating the future behavior of executives, 
not for correcting poor performance. Therefore, executive turnover is expected to have no 
influence on subsequent firm performance. 
 
Empirical implications 
It will be very difficult for researchers to know actual performance thresholds and thus to test the 
model directly. The indirect method of testing these predictions would be to collect data about a 
set of executive changes and note whether the above relationships are observed, after controlling 
for other factors that might influence executive rents, dismissals, and performance outcomes. 
Because we are unable to observe actual profitability thresholds and levels of motivation, we will 
assume that the profitability threshold is a random variable whose average, in accordance with 
point 2) above, increases with the noise in performance measurement and, in accordance with 
point 3), decreases with executive rents. 
Once we have controlled for the level of benefits and noise in performance measurement, 
lower levels of performance imply greater probability that the threshold is not exceeded, and 
therefore, that dismissal will follow (see Figure 1, top right cell).  
Hypothesis 1: The probability of executive turnover is negatively associated with firm 
performance. 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a frequently observed association between firm performance and 
executive turnover. This relationship has traditionally been interpreted as evidence that boards of 
directors are trying to align the interests of executives with those of the shareholders. The 
efficiency wage model shows that for this to occur, a series of additional relationships 
synthesized in Hypotheses 2 and 3 below are also necessary. 
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In accordance with point 2) above, once we have controlled for the level of executive 
rents, the probability that the threshold is greater than firm performance is higher in companies 
with higher risk (see Figure 1, bottom right cell). 
Hypothesis 2: The probability of executive turnover is positively associated with the noise in 
firm performance. 
Similarly, in accordance with point 3), once we have controlled for the level of risk in 
firm performance, the probability that performance will fall below the threshold is lower among 
firms with higher levels of executive rents (see Figure 1, bottom right cell). 
Hypothesis 3: The probability of executive turnover will be negatively associated with the 
level of executive rents. 
Some extensions to the basic model can be made when there are teams of executives. 
Boards can use additional mechanisms to alleviate some of the information problems associated 
with executive effort. One mechanism would be to use mutual monitoring as a way of providing 
peer pressure. When executives work in teams, the possibility of improving team-level results 
increases the incentives for mutual control among team members. Kandel and Lazear (1992) 
argue that the effectiveness of this type of peer pressure will be reduced as team size increases, 
because the marginal value of peer pressure decreases with team size, and because it becomes 
more difficult to identify free riders as team sizes increases. Because mutual control leads to 
higher motivation, more mutual control reduces the need for motivation via the dismissal threat 
and consequently, after controlling for executive rents and risk, we expect lower dismissal 
probabilities. Therefore, we expect that in larger teams, where mutual control is weaker, there 
will be greater likelihood of turnover (for further details see extensions of Appendix A). 
Hypothesis 4: The probability of executive turnover will be positively associated with the 
size of the top management team. 
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It is important to remember that in the efficiency wage model, dismissal is not an 
instrument designed to directly resolve poor firm performance. Dismissal, in this model, is an 
exemplary action, taken to motivate future executives. Therefore, we do not expect 
improvements in firm performance after executive turnover. 
Hypothesis 5: Executive turnover will have no effect on subsequent firm performance. 
The predictions of the model seem consistent with previous empirical results in sports 
team studies (Grusky, 1963; Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Pfeffer & Davis-Blake, 1986) and the 
model may also help explain the persistent observation that succession often does not lead to 
improved firm performance (for a review, see Warner, Watts, & Wruck 1988 or Furtado & 
Karan, 1990). 
Other Explanations of Executive Job Change 
Empirically we only observe executive turnover, but the observed turnover could be caused by a 
number of different reasons beside the alignment of executive and shareholder interests. In this 
section we summarize some of these arguments and their implications. 
In a world of perfect information, we would expect that firm needs and executive abilities 
would align perfectly. Rosen (1982) argues that in such a world, executives with greater abilities 
will occupy jobs with greater responsibility because they are more productive in those jobs. 
Further, changes in the firm’s environment and/or in executive abilities lead to movement 
through the job allocation process. In this ideal world, there would be a continuous “fit” between 
the changes observed in the environment, executive abilities, and firm needs.  
The literature on internal labor markets draws a completely different picture than that 
implied by the perfect information scenario (Doeringer & Piore, 1971). This literature rests on 
the notion of firm-specific investments, firm-specific human capital in particular, which is of 
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zero value outside a particular firm (Becker, 1964; Topel 1991; Castanias & Helfalt, 1991; 1992; 
Harris & Helfalt, 1997). For example, Kotter (1982: p. 60) argues that for the first six months to 
a year in a job, managers invest most of their time in developing the goals and the objectives of 
their businesses, largely firm-specific investments. To the extent that firm-specific investments 
are important we would expect to observe few executives changing employers, because such 
changes are costly, especially to the executives, who rely solely or largely on their human capital 
for income. Yet, mobility clearly exists in the executive labor market (Dalton & Kesner, 1983; 
Baker et al., 1994a; 1994b). This evidence suggests that although firm-specific investments are 
important, there must be other explanations.  
Leonard (1990) and Baker et al. (1994b) suggest a “learning by doing” process as an 
explanation of job mobility. This theory was not developed with executives in mind, but rather 
designed for lower-level workers. Although initially the workers do make firm-specific 
investments, they also develop other skills, especially over time. These skills can be specific to 
an industry, such as knowledge of technological aspects, or more general, such as overall social 
abilities or networks. Movement between jobs, despite the loss of productivity arising from the 
inability to transfer firm-specific abilities, can be explained by the fact that the worker’s generic 
or industry-specific skills are more productive in other firms than in the present job. Thus, the 
learning by doing approach predicts that some workers are motivated to change jobs in a search 
of a better use of their abilities. 
The learning by doing approach implies that new jobs will offer better compensation and 
benefits than old jobs. As noted above, however, this theory was not designed with executives in 
mind. One problem with extending this model to executives is the overall size of the market, or 
the number of positions available at any given time. The learning by doing approach assumes 
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that there are better positions available for workers to move into. This poses a significant 
challenge to the model when applied to executives of large public corporations, because it seems 
unlikely that the availability of better jobs will be adequate to encourage much executive 
movement. As firm size increases, and as hierarchical level increases, the pool of equivalent or 
better jobs shrinks.  
A final literature stream implies that executive movement is prompted by dramatic shifts 
in firm strategy. Virany, Tushman & Romanelli (1992) argue that when strategy changes 
dramatically, the skills required to design and implement the new strategy are likely quite 
different than those accumulated by the executives in charge of the old strategy. In this context, 
the replacement of executives should improve the fit between the firm’s needs and executive 
resources. These arguments have been used to explain why firms sometimes hire outsiders as 
CEOs (Helmich, 1975; Wiersema, 1992). Empirical evidence suggests that firms strive to fit the 
abilities of new executives to strategic requirements (Virany et al., 1992; Datta & Rajagopalan, 
1998), and that large shifts in strategy often lead to wholesale replacement of top managers 
(Virany et al., 1992). 
The situations described above are characterized by changes that affect the needs of 
firms, implying a reorientation in their strategy, or in alternative uses of the executive time, 
leading to better employment outside the original firm. As in the case of a retirement, there is no 
prediction about the relationship between poor performance and executive turnover. However, 
changes such as those described above do lead to a greater probability of executive turnover, so 
it is necessary to control for these alternative explanations. 
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METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
The population for this study is publicly traded US manufacturing firms (SIC 2000 through 
3999) listed continuously on COMPUSTAT between 1986 and 1992. We first identified all such 
firms, then ranked them by assets and divided them into 10 deciles. Then, we randomly selected 
28 firms from each decile.  
Data were collected for the years 1986 through 1992. The primary data source for the 
executive exit study was the list of current officers and directors provided in each annual report 
to shareholders. These officer lists provided us with a fiscal year end “snapshot” of the 
company’s executive cadre. Data on executive salaries were gathered from proxy statements. 
These statements reveal the salaries only of the 5 highest-paid officers in the firm, so many 
sample executives had no salary information available. Data on company-level annual financial 
performance (ROA) and industry average financial performance (industry ROA) were gathered 
from COMPUSTAT. Data on shareholder returns were gathered from the Center for Research on 
Security Prices (CRSP) tapes. We attempted to gather firm-level data for each year during the 
observation period. Ideally, we would have data on 1,680 firm-years (280 firms times 6 years 
each4), but missing data (usually missing annual reports or financial information) reduced the 
final number of firm-years to 1,644. 
The unit of analysis for the study is the executive, not the firm. The original database 
includes information on 14,045 executive-years. However, missing data (most often the 
executive’s age) reduced the number of observations to 12,805. We included each officer of a 
sample firm for each year in which he or she served as an officer.  
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Measures 
Executive turnover. For each executive-year, we dummy coded a variable, exit, to indicate the 
presence or absence of a turnover during the following fiscal year. For this reason, the final year 
of observation for each firm is used only for this purpose, and does not comprise part of the 
sample analyzed. This permits us to establish temporal precedence (performance occurs before 
turnover), which we felt was essential to a rigorous test of our hypotheses. We identified 1,694 
cases in which the executive’s employment terminated in the following year (exit=1), and these 
comprise about 13% of the observations. 
Firm performance. We use two measures of firm performance.5 The first, Return On 
Assets (ROA), is a commonly used and well-understood measure of firm performance 
particularly appropriate for manufacturing firms (e.g. Boyd, 1994; Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993). 
We calculated each firm’s ROA as income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations divided by net assets as reported during each fiscal year. 6 Our second performance 
measure was shareholder return. We calculated this measure by compounding the daily returns 
reported on the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) tapes during each fiscal year. 
These returns are adjusted for dividends and stock splits, so the compounded return measure 
accurately reflects the returns shareholders have realized at the end of a fiscal year from a $1.00 
investment made on the first day of the fiscal year. 
Relative performance. Some authors (Holmstrom, 1979; Lambert & Larcker, 1987) argue 
that additional information related to firm performance can help improve the evaluation of 
executive effort. For this purpose we include the industry average return on assets for the year 
(industry ROA) and the average stock market return for the fiscal year7 (market return) from 
CRSP. Industry ROA is at the two-digit Standard Industrial Code (SIC) level. Market return is 
the adjusted stock return for a fully diversified portfolio during the firm’s fiscal year. 
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Firm risk. Our primary risk measure8 is the standard deviation in daily returns during the 
year of the observation from CRSP. Following the usual convention, we refer to this measure as 
total risk.  
Executive salary. Salary is measured in dollars, and refers only to cash compensation, 
comprised of salary and cash bonuses. It does not include information about share ownership or 
stock options. Although more information it is always welcome, we believe that the lack of 
ownership information will not have important implications in our tests, as shares or stock 
options will usually remain in the possession of the executives after employment is terminated. 
What the theory proposes to measure is the compensation the executive loses due to employment 
termination.  
We log transformed salary for our analyses. We refer to the final measure as log(salary). 
Unfortunately, as implied above, many of the salaries are missing (at best, salaries are publicly 
available only for the 5 highest paid executives in publicly-traded companies). For this reason, 
we conduct some analyses only among the 5,761 executive-years for which salary information is 
available. 
Top management team size. TMT size is number of officers reported for the firm in the 
given year. This is a standard measure in the literature about top management teams (Hambrick, 
1994). 
 
Control variables. A critical concern in our analyses is to control for the fact that a key 
reason for executive job termination is retirement. Although it is difficult to know if a turnover 
represents a retirement, we control for this concern by including the age of the executive in the 
analyses.  
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As argued by Leonard (1990) and Baker et al. (1994b), executives learn by doing on the 
job and improve their abilities over time. However, sometimes internal promotion is blocked 
because all the positions ahead of the executive are filled. When the firm’s top officer (typically 
the CEO) is of advanced age, it increases the probability that younger executives may soon move 
up in the hierarchy. To control for this alternative, we include a measure of the incumbent CEO’s 
age – CEO age.  
Firm-specific investments have been argued as a reason to stay with a single employer. 
Following this logic, an executive’s tenure at the firm will be correlated with the level of specific 
investments accumulated. Unfortunately, we could not gather complete information on firm 
tenure. We instead substituted observation in our sample for this measure. An executive’s tenure 
can be divided into two intervals - the years in the firm before the observation period, and the 
years in the firm during the observation period. We only have information about this second 
measure. We refer to this measure as sample tenure. Zero values of sample tenure can have two 
meanings: 1) the executive is new to the firm; 2) the executive is not new in the firm but is new 
in the sample. Therefore, we included an indicator variable (new) with a value of one for 
executives who are left-censored by the observation window.  
Firms in different economic sectors can suffer different shocks that increase or decrease 
the demand for executives and variations in observed performance, and consequently the level of 
executive turnover. A total of 28 dummy variables were created to control for fixed industry 
effects at the 2-digit SIC level. We refer to these 28 dummy variables collectively as industry 
controls. 
Information is available about the titles held by each executive, and our sample includes a 
total of 40 different titles. We classify the executives into one of 5 levels in accordance with the 
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importance of the title held. Appendix B provides a breakdown of titles and their associated 
levels. Our 5 categories are top officer, which is held by one and only one executive for each 
firm year level 1, which includes Presidents and other very senior titles; level 2; level 3, and level 
4. The final category (level 4) comprises about 10% of the sample and is the category omitted in 
most analyses.  
Finally we control for the size of the firm, measured by the log(assets) and log(sales), 
where both assets and sales are measured in millions of dollars. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 provides basic descriptive statistics for two samples. The first 2 columns provide means 
and standard deviations for the overall sample, while the second 2 columns provide 
corresponding statistics for the sub-sample with complete data on executive salaries. The table 
indicates that shareholder return (14%) is quite a bit larger than ROA (3%). Further, shareholder 
return is about 7 points lower than the average market return (22%). The two samples (the full 
sample and the salary sub-sample) post very similar numbers across the variables in Table 1. 
Perhaps the greatest difference is that the salary sub-sample (not surprisingly) consists of more 
senior executives than the full sample. This is because salaries are publicly available only for the 
5 highest paid executives in the firm.  
_______________________ 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
_______________________ 
What Table 1 does not indicate clearly is the age distribution of executives terminating 
their employment. The average age of executives in the sample, as indicated in Table 1, is 50.8, 
but the average age of the executive whose employment ends (exit=1) is 52. The median age of 
exiting executives is also 52. Further, while retirements are clearly an important part of the 
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sample, as the modal age of exiting executives is 64, only 16.3% of the exiting executives are of 
age 63 or greater. To rephrase for emphasis, when only executives in their final year of 
employment are considered, the average age is 52, and less than 17% of this group is aged 63 or 
older. Clearly, retirements are not the most frequent cause of executive exits in our sample.  
The Likelihood of Dismissal 
To test hypotheses related to dismissal probabilities (Hypotheses 1-4) we selected a discrete-time 
event-history approach (Allison, 1984). This permits us to model each year’s exit probability as a 
function of the previous year’s observed performance and context, and to update the independent 
variables each year. We used logistic regression models with observations corresponding to 
executive-years, the dependent variable exit (coded 0 or 1), and the independent variables 
discussed above. 
Table 2 presents the results of our analyses. Model 1 includes the independent variables 
described above without industry controls, comparative measures of performance (industry 
ROA, market return) or log(salary). Model 2 includes the industry control variables and 
comparative measures of firm performance, while Model 3 includes the salaries. Note that in 
Model 3, the sample is restricted to those executives with salary data, which is less than half of 
the overall sample.  
_______________________ 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
_______________________ 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the probability of dismissal will be negatively associated with 
firm performance. As predicted, the coefficients associated with ROA and shareholder return are 
negative and significant in both Models 1 and 2 of Table 2. For example, in Model 1 the 
respective coefficients are -.619, p<.01; and -.171, p<.01. The turnover probability is reduced 
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from the 13.2% estimated for the average value of all the independent variables to a 13.1 % 9 
when both measures of firm performance increase one percentage point. This evidence provides 
support for Hypothesis 1.  
Model 2 includes the industry dummy variables, industry ROA, and market return as 
control variables. The inclusion of these control variables has little impact on the other reported 
coefficients. Industry ROA is just significant at the 5% level, but both market return and the set 
of industry dummy variables are significant at the 1% level.  
In Model 3, which is restricted to the sub-sample for which there is salary data, 
shareholder return is no longer significant. Further, the size of the coefficient associated with 
ROA is nearly double that of the regular sample. To see whether this was due to sampling 
differences or the inclusion of log(salary) in the model, we ran the analysis again without 
log(salary). The observed coefficient for ROA changed very little. We also tested for alternative 
explanations, such as the low representation of executives from level 4, but the estimates of 
Model 1 and 2 also changed very little when these executives were removed. This suggests that 
the change in the size of the ROA coefficient is due to other sample differences between the 
overall sample and the salary subsample. 
Hypothesis 2 implies that the probability of executive dismissal will be positively 
associated with firm risk. The coefficients associated with total risk are, in all models, positive 
and significantly different from zero. Evaluated at the average value of all the variables, an 
increase of one per cent in total risk increases the turnover probability to 14.6% in Model 1, an 
increase of 1.4 percentage points. Results for Models 2 and 3 are very similar. This evidence 
provides strong support for Hypothesis 2.  
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Hypothesis 3 predicts that an executive’s probability of dismissal will be inversely 
associated with salary. The coefficient associated with log(salary) in Model 3 is negative and 
significant (B=-.22; p<.05). Evaluated at the average value of all the variables, an increase of one 
percent in an executive’s salary reduces turnover probability by .03 percentage points. This 
evidence provides support for Hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis 4 argues that larger top management teams lead to a greater likelihood of 
turnover. The coefficients associated with TMT size are positive and significant in all 3 models 
in Table 2. Evaluated at the average value of all the variables, one additional member of the 
TMT implies a reduction of around .04 percentage points in the turnover probability for the team 
members. Thus, Hypothesis 4 receives strong support from the evidence reported.  
The control variables provide some interesting (and expected) results. Executive age is 
positive and significant, probably indicating a retirement effect. The coefficient associated with 
top officer age is also negative and significant, suggesting a tendency for fewer exits as the 
incumbent nears retirement. The coefficient for sample tenure is negative and significantly 
different from zero in all the models estimated, suggesting that executive tenure could help to 
reduce dismissal probabilities. The coefficients for top officer are consistently negative and 
significant, indicating that the CEO is less likely to depart than executives at level 4 (the 
category omitted). However, coefficients associated with levels 1 and 2 are not significantly 
different from those of level 4. Also, coefficients associated with level 3 are positive and 
significant, indicating that executives from level 3 are actually more likely to exit than those in 
level 4. Thus, hierarchical position seems to affect dismissal probabilities. The CEO faces a 
lower likelihood of exit than other officers of the firm. We also test for different sensitiveness of 
dismissal probabilities to performance and risk measures among hierarchical levels, but none 
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were significant. The coefficients associated with firm size, log(assets) and log(sales) are 
consistently insignificant, indicating that firm size has no effect on turnover likelihood among 
executives. Finally, the set of coefficients associated with the industry controls and the year 
when the observation was collected are significantly different from zero, indicating oscillations 
in the proportion of executive turnovers across industries and years. 
Consequences of Dismissal on Firm Performance 
The efficiency wage model explains executive dismissal as an exemplary action for the 
executives and consequently without direct consequences for the future results of the firm 
(Hypothesis 5). To test this hypothesis we take as unit of analysis the firms, working with an 
incomplete panel of 264 firms and 1,264 observations between 1987 to 1991. We compare the 
changes in performance of three different kinds of firms: those that have changed their top 
executive once during the sample period; those with more than one top executive change 
(various changes); and those without any changes of top executive during the sample period. 
Those with no changes comprised the omitted category in our analysis.  
For those firms with only one change, we codify the different years in reference to the 
turnover year, year 0. We use the dummy variable year 1 to indicate the year following the 
turnover, and the dummy year -1 to indicate the year before the turnover. The dummy variables 
After year 1 and Before year -1 capture the other years. Table 3 shows the determinants of the 
annual firm performance measures, shareholder returns and return on assets (ROA).  
_______________________ 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
_______________________ 
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Among the temporal dummy variables, the only significant performance effect is for 
shareholder returns during the year of the turnover. Evidence in Table 3 implies that shareholder 
returns are 19.3% greater in firms without a top executive turnover relative to all other categories 
The other important result is that those firms with more than one turnover during the sample 
period have lower ROA (p<.05). 
 The market value has usually been interpreted as the expected present value of the future 
profits of firms. The results obtained in Table 3 seems to indicate that top executive dismissals 
do not affect the real future profits of the firm, but instead effect the expected value of the firm’s 
future returns. Our interpretation is that the dismissal of top executives gives information to the 
market. Before top executive dismissal, the market agents expect that the firm will take action 
against the executive because it is optimal according to the efficiency wage model. If no 
dismissal occurs, the market punishes the firm because the firm is reducing pressure on its top 
management. Consequently the dismissal increases the market value of the firm (shareholder 
return) with little modification to real future performance (ROA). Murphy and Zimmerman 
(1993), using a similar methodology, did not find significant differences in shareholders returns 
the turnover year, so further empirical research is needed to confirm our results. 
DISCUSSION 
A great deal of literature associated with agency theory has considered dismissal as a way to 
align executive and shareholder interests. Efficiency wage theory helps to better understand this 
argument and how it would work in real settings. Because there are always information 
problems, directors have no exact measures of executive performance, and must therefore use 
only imperfect measures to estimate performance. An efficient way to proceed is to establish a 
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threshold level of performance that will be tolerated, and dismiss executives when performance 
falls below the threshold.  
The efficiency wage model captures the key variables that are critical for directors when 
establishing salary levels and performance thresholds. Directors must decide the limits of 
acceptable poor performance, but in coordination with the quality of the performance measures 
and the level of salary provided. Therefore executives of poor performing firms have greater 
probabilities of dismissal, and the probabilities increase with the risk of the performance measure 
and decrease with the level of executive salary. We extended the model to include mutual 
monitoring through teamwork and we control for the effects of hierarchical level in the empirical 
analysis. 
Our empirical tests analyzed the determinants of executive dismissal by focusing on the 
variables highlighted by the efficiency wage model. In general we find support for the predicted 
relationships. As has been reported in other empirical work, poor performance is an important 
determinant of executive turnover (Kesner & Sebora, 1994; Murphy, 1999). Our results suggest 
that both accounting and shareholder returns are important for evaluating executive performance.  
As argued by the efficiency wage model, dismissal policies will align executive and 
shareholder interest more efficiently if they are coordinated with compensation policies and the 
firm’s risk profile – hypotheses largely untested previously. The effect is due to the fact that the 
executive’s economic motivation to reduce dismissal probabilities depends on these two 
variables. For example, when performance improves by 1%, the reduction in dismissal 
probability is 10 percent greater for those executives in firms with a risk of 0.1% greater, or a 
salary 5% lower than the average. Consequently we find that executives who work at risky firms, 
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and those who are relatively low paid, after controlling for firm performance, have greater 
probabilities of dismissal.  
The data also supports the notion that boards of directors may combine different 
mechanisms to align executive and shareholder interests, such as the peer pressure of colleagues. 
This evidence should be extended in future work to test the reduction of dismissal probabilities at 
firms with a greater use of other incentive mechanisms, such as the sensitivity of pay to 
performance. Future research should also check to see if the results we report are robust to the 
introduction of variables such as stock ownership or stock option compensation. We also find 
some evidence that hierarchical position can affect dismissal probability, in the sense that 
executives in lower hierarchical positions tend to be dismissed first. Theoretical models could be 
developed in order to consider differences in dismissal policies across hierarchical levels. 
We have controlled for several alternative explanations of executive exit. We controlled 
for retirement through consideration of executive age. We controlled for advancement potential 
by the age of the incumbent CEO. Finally, our results suggest that longer-tenured executives are 
less likely to turnover than shorter-tenured ones. We explain this fact by an expected relationship 
between executive tenure and firm-specific human capital. 
Turnover has often been assumed to be a punishment, but there has been little 
examination of the consequences of dismissal on executives. For each of the 1,694 executives 
who terminated their employment with a sample firm during our observation period, we looked 
among the roster of executives of public firms (Compact Disclosure database) to see if they 
could be found among the officer lists of publicly traded firms. We looked for 2 consecutive 
years after the executive’s employment was ended, and we were able to find only 139 of the 
terminated executives with another public corporation. We then gathered data on the new firms 
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where the executives were found as well as their hierarchical positions and salaries. We were 
able to gather performance data on only 128 of the new employers, so analyses using 
performance comparisons between old and new firms were even smaller than the “found” sample 
of 139. Even more disappointing, we were able to find salary information on only a very small 
proportion of the re-employed executives. Working with estimated salaries based on the 
executive job positions, we compute a 7% reduction on salaries among re-employed executives. 
Obviously, more rigorous research is needed to confirm the existence of a punishment associated 
with dismissals, as these first results seem to suggest. 
Finally, we do not find a clear improvement in accounting performance after executive 
turnover, but the turnover policy seems to be positively valued by the stock market compared 
with the continuity option, reinforcing the applicability of the model. 
The efficiency wage model is a normative model that allows us to develop a series of 
predictions regarding other actions that firms should take to make the dismissal of executives an 
effective motivator for remaining or future executives. The empirical evidence corroborates most 
predictions, but the variables used only explain a small part of management rotation. In this 
sense, as highlighted in recent articles (e.g. Shen & Cannella, 2002) theories on the influence of 
power in organizations could increase the spectrum of variables to be analyzed. In fact, these 
theories could complement each other. Efficiency wages could also be interpreted as a 
modelization of the process of the loss of power of top executives in the eyes of the board of 
directors.  
The efficiency wage model does not explain how boards come to implant dismissal 
policies. The institutional theory of action has recently been applied to this type of event (Ocasio, 
1999). Efficiency wages, in this situation, could be interpreted as a prediction of the types of 
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rules that are ultimately imposed, but no prediction is evident regarding how that process is 
articulated. Perhaps future research can integrate these different lines of theory. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The efficiency wage model is a normative model that could help to improve the alignment of 
interests between executives and shareholders. This theory postulates that dismissal policies are 
more efficient when they are coordinated with compensation strategies, taking into account the 
information problems that arise when inferring executive performance from firm performance. 
The evidence presented supports the theoretical arguments but also emphasizes the need to 
extend the model to include other factors, such as the existence of firm-specific investments, the 
existence of overlapping agency relationships as internal monitors or controls, and some 
alternative methods of executive supervision and motivation, like pay for performance 
compensation. Further work is, of course, needed to complement and extend the evidence and 
theory presented here. 
NOTES 
 
1The economics literature has also analyzed these issues. See Murphy (1999) for a recent 
synthesis. 
 
2This relationship will exist for whatever continuous distribution function where the probability 
level decreases as we move away from its average point. 
 
3In fact, the efficiency wage model can be applied to analyze any situation where there is a fixed 
premium if certain requirements are fulfilled – for example bonuses for reaching certain 
standards or objectives. 
 
4As explained in detail later, the final year of the firm in the dataset was used to determine 
turnover, but could not be used as part of the sample analyzed. 
 
5We also ran analyses on risk-adjusted performance, and achieved very similar results. All the 
analyses cited but not presented in the text are available upon request. 
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6The theory does not specify the temporal limits of the performance measures. The accumulation 
of firm performances referred to different years has not significantly improved the empirical tests 
and forces us to reduce the number of observations. We will work with annual performances. 
 
7We also ran some analyses using market returns for weighted industry portfolios. Because the 
market returns variable was not significant, we omitted it. 
 
8We also ran some analyses using measures such as unsystematic risk, or the variance of annual 
market returns and returns on assets. The results were essentially the same as those reported here, 
and because these measures were very highly correlated, se elected to use only one of them. 
 
9In all the cases the dismissal probability has been computed when the rest of variables take their 
average value. In the case of Models 2 and 3 the reduction is very similar to the mentioned 
above, around 0.1%. 
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APPENDIX 1 
An Extension of the Efficiency Wage Model 
The social efficient effort 
Assume that company profits P before paying top executive compensation w, can be expressed 
in accordance with the effort of the executive (e0) and other factors that he or she does not 
control, P= g(e) + x, where x is a random variable that is distributed like a normal one with mean 
equal to zero and a variance of 2 . The expected profits g(e) increase with the effort g’(e) >0, 
and in order to assure an interior solution we assume that g’(0)>1, g”(e)< 0 and g(0)=0 to 
guarantee that optimal profits will be positive. The executive’s effort supposes a cost, e, so if 
either the company owners or the executive are neutral to risk (w-e is the executive utility 
function), both would agree to the maximum level of effort e* to be made, e* = argmax g(e)-e, 
and consequently g ‘ (e*) =1. The level e* maximizes the profits of the firm subject to the 
participation restriction: 
 Maxe : E(P) - E(w) 
 Subject to: E(w) - e = U           where U  is the reserve utility. 
The effort e* also is the solution to the utility maximization problem of the executives subject to 
guarantee a certain level of expected profits, P , to the firm, for further details see for example 
Milgrom & Roberts (1992, ch. 7). If the effort is not observable or contractible, the executive 
will not exert effort, e=0. Different solutions have been proposed to this situation. The executives 
can buy all the shares of the firm if they have enough richness or tournaments can be used to 
rank executives that do similar tasks. Another alternative are dismissal policies.  
How can the said effort be implanted? 
Most articles on top executive turnover, referring to the agency theory, assume that dismissal can 
be a mechanism for achieving the said levels of effort. If the dismissal includes a penalty for the 
executive, the firm might establish a minimum profit level, T, such that if the profit obtained is 
greater than this level, the executive stays in the company, and if it is lower, he or she is 
dismissed. The probability of that happening can be expressed as: 
p= Prob (P<T) = Prob ( x < T- g(e) ) = Prob ( z < (T- g(e) )/  ) = F((T- g(e) )/  ), 
where z= x/  and F is therefore the function of normal accumulated distribution of mean zero 
and a variance of one.  
The behavior of the executive 
The executive will decide on the level of effort that maximizes his or her well-being, considering 
that the greater the effort, the lower the probability of dismissal. Executives receive rents in their 
present job, r >0, that they will lose in the case of being dismissed (see Shapiro and Stiglitz 
(1984) for a more complete discussion of the forms that the said rents can take). So if s>0 is the 
compensation received by the executive in the case of being dismissed, and s+r in the case of 
being in the firm, the expected compensation of the executive will be E(w) = (s+r ) (1- p) + s p.  
 
So the executive will exert the effort that maximizes his utility, Maxe:E(w) -e, taking into 
account the threshold T and the rents r fixed by the firm and its profit risk,  . 
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The first order condition for a local maximum of the problem above is fulfilled when f((T- g(e) )/ 
 ) g’(e)=  /r, where f is the density function of the normal distribution with a mean equal to 
zero and unitary variance. The second order condition for a local maximum is fulfilled when:  
r (f((T- g(e) )/  ) g”(e)/   - f ‘((T- g(e) )/  ) g’(e) g’(e)/  2) <0. 
Take note that a priori the first order condition can have more than one solution. In that cases 
nothing guarantees that the local maximum is the global one. 
 
The firm’s problem 
The firm should determine the threshold of profits T and the rents r to give executives an 
incentive to make an effort of e* , taking note that g ‘ (e*) =1. 
They can obtain it fulfilling conditions i) and ii): 
 
i) T= - f-1 ( /r) + g(e*), wheref-1 ( /r) is the absolute value of the inverse function of 
the density function of a normal zero-one.  
Take note that in this case, (T-g(e*))/ = -f-1( /r) 0. So when f(z) is only defined for z 0, -
f-1( /r)= f-1 ( /r). 
 
ii)  /r  f(g(e*)/ ).  
 
Condition ii) guarantees that f-1 ( /r) is defined, due that /r  f(g(e*)/ )  f(0), and 
consequently condition i) assures that e* is a local optimum due that fulfills the first and second 
order conditions of the executive’s utility maximization due that g’(e*) > 0, g”(e*)< 0 and f ‘(T- 
g(e*) )/ ) 0 when T-g(e*)0. 
  
Condition ii) also implies that T 0 what assures that for all the relevant efforts (e0) we will 
have that expected firm profits will be greater than the threshold, T-g(e)  T  0 due that g(0)=0, 
and consequently fulfill the second order condition, r (f((T- g(e) )/  ) g”(e)/   - f ‘((T- g(e) )/ 
 ) g’(e) g’(e)/  2) <0, so e* it is also a global maximum effort for the executive. 
 
An empirical test 
Researchers cannot usually observe the minimum profit level to continue in firm T, but it can be 
observed the executives that have been dismissed, those whose firm’s profits falls below the 
imposed limit, P<T= - f-1 ( /r) + g(e*) by condition i) or in terms of the standardized 
profits, Ps = (P- g(e*) )/  ) < -f-1 ( /r) = Ts, being Ts the threshold for standardized profits, 
and then, perfectly related with the dismissal probability. Therefore the dismissal probabilities, 
increases with performance risk  , 0)/(f -1   rTs , and decreases with rents r, 
0)/(f -1  rrrTs  , due that f ‘(z)  0 when z  0. We can define the variable Y= Ts - 
Ps, but unfortunately researchers will have several difficulties to observe Ts. Due that that it, 
from Taylor expansion we can approximate the function above as: 
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Y* = a + c   + d r + h Ps +  
expecting that c >0, d<0 and h <0. Y* corresponds to the latent variable of a logit or pobit model, 
depending on the assumptions made regarding the distribution of the error term . 
 
 
Dismissal probabilities and consequently Y*: 
1. Decreases with profits, P (Hypothesis 1 implies h <0). 
2. Increases with risk,    (Hypothesis 2 implies c >0). 
3. Decreases with executive rents, r (Hypothesis 3 implies d <0). 
 
Extensions and limitations 
1. We do not exclude other possible solutions to the frim’s problem. More concretely, 
T= + f-1 ( /r) + g(e*)   
This solution implies, T- g(e*) > 0, fulfilling the first order condition and in some particular 
cases, (g”(e*) < r f ‘(f-1 ( /r)) / 2 < 0), also fulfills the second order condition. If this point 
could be implemented as a global maximum for the executive, it imposes dismissal probabilities 
greater than fifty percent and consequently higher than those imposed in the solution proposed 
and usually found by the empirical evidence (Murphy,1999). In the text, all the hypotheses have 
been developed assuming that firms do not implement this solution. 
 
2. One can consider the presence of incentives: s= a + b P. The first order condition of the 
executive decisions can be reformulated as: 
g’(e) (b + r f((T- g(e))/   )/  ) = 1 
so in order to implement the optimal level of effort, e*, and given that g’(e*)=1, then Ts= f-1 ((1-
b) /r). All the relationships above are maintained. If we assume that the incentives depend on 
the number of team members, b= 1/n, then the dismissal probability increases with the size of the 
top management team, similar result than those proposed in Hypothesis 4. 
 
3. Further work is needed to understand the market equilibrium with the contracts analyzed 
before, in line with the former work of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), or for example, which 
combination of incentive systems (dismissal policies, bonuses, stock options...) could be optimal 
under different circumstances. How to modelize in a manageable way risk aversion 
considerations, costs of dismiss executives, wealth and rents limitations, is something that in the 
actual literature, as far as we know, has not been done yet.  
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APPENDIX 2 
The Ranking of Job Positions 
ORIGINAL TITLE  LEVEL 
ADMINISTRATIVE VICEPRESIDENT 4 
APPOINTED 4 
ASSISTANT CHIEF COUNSEL 4 
ASSISTANT GENERAL COUNSEL 4 
ASSISTANT GENERAL MANAGER 4 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY 4 
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT 4 
ASSISTANT TO THE TREASURER 4 
AUDITOR 4 
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD 1 
CHIEF ACCOUNTING OFFICER 2 
CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER 2 
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 1 
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER 2 
CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER 2 
CONSULTANT 4 
CONTROLLER 4 
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN 2 
DIVISION PRESIDENT 3 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER 3 
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 2 
FINANCIAL VICE PRESIDENT 3 
GENERAL ATTORNEY 4 
GENERAL MANAGER 4 
GENERAL OFFICER 4 
GROUP PRESIDENT 3 
GROUP VICE PRESIDENT 3 
LEGAL COUNSEL 4 
MANAGING DIRECTOR 4 
OFFICE DIRECTOR 2 
PRESIDENT 1 
PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER 2 
SECRETARY 4 
SENIOR EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT 2 
SENIOR FINANCIAL OFFICER 2 
SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT 2 
SUBSIDIARY OFFICER 3 
TREASURER 4 
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD 2 
VICE PRESIDENT 3 
In the category of TOPOFFICER is any executive that is the highest ranking officer in the firm 
at the time. This person most often holds the title “CEO”. Initially, all TOPOFFICERs fell into 
Level 1. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Overall Sample, Compared with Salary Subsample 
 
  
Overall Sample 
Subsample with Salary 
Information Available 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Exit (0/1) 0.132 0.339 0.110 0.314 
ROA 0.028 0.154 0.027 0.153 
Shareholder Return 0.142 0.547 0.140 0.564 
Total Risk 0.030 0.020 0.032 0.019 
TMT Size 11.981 7.599 9.719 5.186 
Log(Salary)   12.247 0.769 
Top Officer (0/1) 0.116 0.320 0.221 0.415 
Level 1 (0/1) 0.061 0.394 0.100 0.301 
Level 2 (0/1) 0.228 0.420 0.308 0.420 
Level 3 (0/1) 0.495 0.500 0.355 0.500 
Level 4 (0/1) 0.101 0.300 0.016 0.120 
Industry ROA 0.030 0.017 0.030 0.017 
Market Return 0.218 0.263 0.220 0.266 
Top Officer Age 56.002 8.448 55.753 8.812 
Executive Age 50.799 9.211 52.034 9.018 
Sample Tenure 1.788 1.591 2.106 1.609 
New (0/1) 0.136 0.342 0.051 0.219 
Log(Sales) 5.310 2.296 4.842 2.111 
Log(Assets) 5.574 2.216 5.102 2.027 
Observations 12,805 5,761 
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Table 2 
The Probability of Executive Turnover 
Dependent Variable:  Exit 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -3.290** -3.262** -2.621 
ROA -0.619** -0.662** -1.191** 
Shareholder Return -0.171** -0.223** -0.039 
Total Risk 9.894**  10.689** 13.325** 
TMT Size 0.030**  0.032**  0.028** 
Log(Salary)   -0.216* 
Top Officer (0/1) -0.919** -0.942** -0.954** 
Level 1 (0/1) -0.198 -0.262 -0.109 
Level 2 (0/1) 0.032 -0.026 -0.008 
Level 3 (0/1) 0.275** 0.235* 0.192 
Industry ROA  -5.790* -6.972 
Market Return  1.036** 0.862* 
Industry Indicator Variables  YES** YES** 
Top Officer Age -0.016** -0.018** -0.010* 
New (First Year Observed) 0.070  0.069 -0.533* 
Executive Age 0.039**  0.042**  0.038** 
Sample Tenure -0.097** -0.093** -0.214** 
Log(Sales) -0.013 -0.001 0.086 
Log(Assets) -0.020 -0.032 -0.025 
Observation Year Indicators YES** YES** YES** 
Log-Likelihood -4,750.09 -4,706.28 -1,865.22 
2 506.17** 593.80** 280.01** 
Number of Observations 12,805 12,805 5,761 
**, *, significantly different from zero at 1%, 5% respectively. The level of significance 
associated with the industry parameters derives from a multivariate likelihood ratio test 
where the restricted model is without the industry parameters. 
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      Table 3 
Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Firm Performance 
 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variable 
  Shareholder returns        Return on Assets (ROA) 
Constant 
-0.045 0.017 
Before year -1 
0.003 -0.013 
Year -1 
-0.044 -0.018 
Year 0 
0.193** 0.029 
Year 1 
0.017 0.015 
After year 1 
-0.057 0.005 
Various changes 
-0.109 -0.033* 
Market Return  
0.827**  
Industry ROA 
 -0.064 
Log(Sales) 
0.031 0.089** 
Log(Assets) 
-0.031 -0.072** 
Total Risk 
-0.364 -1.483** 
R2 
0.1537 0.2643 
F value (10 , 1253) 
22.75** 45.01** 
Number of 
Observations 1,264 1,264 
**, *, significantly different from zero at 1% and 5%. 
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Figure 1 
The Determinants of Dismissal Probabilities 
 
Theoretical Basic Model 
 
 
 
 
Empirical test: Performance and dismissal 
probabilities. 
 
 
 
 
Variations in the level of firm risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Empirical test: Variations in the average 
threshold.   
 
 
 
 
e- Executives actions. 
P- Firm performance. 
E(P(e)) - Expected firm performance as a function of executive actions. 
T - Performance threshold. 
r - Rents. 
 - Performance noise. 
 
In Appendix A, all of these implications are derived from a simple efficiency wage model. 
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Figure 2 
Determinants of Executives Motivation According From an Efficiency Wage Perspective 
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